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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
  
 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The matter is before the court on a petition for review 
brought by BethEnergy Mines, Inc. arising from an application 
filed on March 9, 1978, by John Vrobel under the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.  The petition 
seeks review of an April 6, 1994 order of the Benefits Review 
Board ("the Board") denying BethEnergy's motion for 
  
reconsideration of a Decision and Order of the Board dated 
December 29, 1992.  Vrobel was a coal miner who for approximately 
34 years worked underground.  In large part Vrobel worked for 
BethEnergy which last employed him on or about September 26, 
1977.  Vrobel died in 1985 and his widow, Eva Vrobel, has been 
substituted as a party in this case.  Thus, Eva Vrobel and the 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("Director"), 
are the respondents.   
 The Department of Labor initially awarded benefits to 
Vrobel but BethEnergy denied liability and accordingly the claim 
was submitted as a contested matter.  There was a formal hearing 
before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on December 18, 1986.  
In February 1987, BethEnergy submitted a closing statement which 
contended that the evidence was insufficient to invoke the 
interim presumption of total disability provided in 20 C.F.R. § 
727.203(a)(1).1  Alternatively, BethEnergy argued that even if 
                     
1
.  The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations 
establishing an interim presumption of total disability, 
applicable in this case, providing that a person who worked at 
least 10 years as a coal miner is presumed to be totally disabled 
by pneumoconiosis and entitled to benefits under the Act if any 
of the following five requirements can be met: (1) an x-ray 
reading establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis; (2) 
ventilatory study measurements establish the presumption of a 
chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease as numerically defined; 
(3) blood gas studies reveal impairment of the flow of oxygen, 
again as defined numerically; (4) other medical evidence, 
including the documented opinion of a physician exercising 
reasoned medical judgment establishes the presence of a total 
impairment; or (5) where a miner is deceased and no medical 
evidence is available, an affidavit of the survivor of the miner 
or other persons with knowledge of the miner's physical 
condition, demonstrates the presence of a totally disabling 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment.  20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) 
(1994). 
  
the interim presumption was invoked, the evidence established 
that it had been rebutted. 
 In a decision issued on April 30, 1987, the ALJ found 
that Vrobel demonstrated that the interim presumption should be 
invoked under 20 C.F.R. §727.203(a)(1) on the basis of x-ray 
evidence establishing the existence of pneumoconiosis.  The ALJ 
further found that BethEnergy failed to establish rebuttal of the 
presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (b)(1), (b)(3) or (b)(4).2  
(..continued) 
 
 The party opposing entitlement may then rebut the 
interim presumption in four different ways.  20 C.F.R. § 
727.203(b)(1)-(4).  The two methods of rebuttal which are most 
relevant to this case are as follows: 
   (b)  Rebuttal of interim presumption.  In 
adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all 
relevant medical evidence shall be 
considered.  The presumption in paragraph (a) 
of this section shall be rebutted if: 
 . . .  
 
        (2)  In light of all relevant 
evidence it is established that the 
individual is able to do his usual 
coal mine work or comparable 
gainful work ...; or 
    (3)  The evidence establishes 
that the total disability or death 
of the miner did not arise in whole 
or in part out of coal mine 
employment. 
2
.    In invoking the interim presumption based on the evidence 
of several positive x-ray readings, the ALJ applied a now-
discredited theory which allowed invocation of the interim 
presumption to be based upon a single piece of qualifying 
evidence, with contrary evidence being weighed only on rebuttal.  
Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986), 
rev'd sub nom. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 
108 S.Ct. 427 (1987).  The Supreme Court in Mullins rejected this 
theory which we had followed in Revak v. National Mines Corp., 
808 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), as the Court held that all relevant 
evidence, including conflicting evidence, must be weighed when 
  
However, the ALJ found that BethEnergy could establish rebuttal 
under (b)(2) because from a pulmonary standpoint Vrobel could 
perform his usual coal mine employment or comparable gainful 
work.  In addition, the ALJ determined that an opinion of a Dr. 
McQuillan that Vrobel did not have a totally disabling 
respiratory impairment was supported by the opinions of two other 
doctors who examined Vrobel.  App. at 152.  As a result, the ALJ 
denied Vrobel benefits. 
 Eva Vrobel then appealed to the Board, arguing that 
Vrobel's pulmonary impairment prevented him from working and, 
accordingly, the ALJ erroneously had found that BethEnergy 
established (b)(2) rebuttal.  In its answering brief BethEnergy 
argued that even if the Board found that in view of Kertesz v. 
Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1986), the ALJ's 
initial finding of rebuttal was inappropriate, the evidence 
nevertheless demonstrated that Vrobel's disability was unrelated 
to coal mine employment, thereby establishing (b)(3) rebuttal.  
App. at 122-23.  Kertesz held that the causation of a miner's 
total disability is not relevant in determining whether there was 
rebuttal under (b)(2).  Id. at 162 n.5.  Instead, a finding of 
any totally disabling contention will preclude (b)(2) rebuttal.   
(..continued) 
deciding to invoke the presumption in the first place.  Mullins, 
484 U.S. at 148-150, 108 S.Ct. at 433-36.  The ALJ later refused 
a request by BethEnergy to reexamine the invocation of the (a)(1) 
presumption under the post-Mullins standard.  Nevertheless, we 
need not address this issue because BethEnergy does not challenge 
the ALJ's refusal in this appeal. 
  
 As BethEnergy anticipated, the Board remanded the case 
on December 30, 1988, for the ALJ to reconsider rebuttal under 
(b)(2) pursuant to Kertesz, and it also instructed the ALJ to 
reconsider rebuttal under (b)(3) pursuant to Bernardo v. 
Director, OWCP, 790 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1986).  App. at 113.  In 
Bernardo, we determined that rebuttal under (b)(3) solely relates 
to the source of the miner's total disability, and not the degree 
of disability.  Thus, the pneumoconiosis need not be the 
exclusive source of the disability.       
 On March 13, 1989, the ALJ in his Decision and Order on 
Remand awarded benefits to Vrobel.  App. at 108.  The ALJ found 
that BethEnergy failed to establish rebuttal under (b)(2) as 
Vrobel had a shoulder condition that could have been totally 
disabling.  App. at 108.  In addition, the ALJ determined that 
BethEnergy failed to establish (b)(3) rebuttal because the 
medical evidence in the record supported a finding that Vrobel's 
total disability at least partly was associated with his coal 
mine employment.  Consequently, BethEnergy failed to establish 
that there was no significant relationship between the total 
disability and coal mine employment.  App. at 109.  
 On April 11, 1989, BethEnergy filed a motion for 
reconsideration, arguing that the ALJ's finding in the initial 
Decision and Order under (b)(2), i.e. that Vrobel was not totally 
disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment, was 
sufficient to establish rebuttal under (b)(3).3  BethEnergy 
                     
3
.    In other words, BethEnergy claimed that inasmuch as the ALJ 
initially found that Vrobel's total disability was unrelated to a 
  
further asserted that (b)(2) rebuttal was satisfied because the 
evidence had failed to establish that Vrobel was totally disabled 
as a result of any condition.  App. at 74.  In addition, 
BethEnergy alleged for the first time that changes in the 
interpretation of (b)(2) and (b)(3) had affected adversely its 
defense of the claim and it requested an opportunity to submit 
additional evidence.4  App. at 68.  On reconsideration, in a 
Decision and Order of July 5, 1989, the ALJ rejected BethEnergy's 
argument concerning total disability under (b)(2) and reiterated 
that BethEnergy failed to establish that Vrobel was not totally 
disabled from any condition.  However, the ALJ determined that 
(b)(3) rebuttal was established.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the ALJ applied Marcum v. Director, OWCP, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 
(..continued) 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment, (b)(3) rebuttal could be 
established because the absence of any significant pulmonary or 
respiratory impairment precludes pneumoconiosis as a cause of 
total disability.  App. at 75.  Thus, in BethEnergy's view, there 
was no significant relationship between the total disability and 
coal mine employment.   
4
.    In particular, BethEnergy asserts that Kertesz, which we 
decided on April 14, 1986, changed the legal standard for 
establishing rebuttal under (b)(2).  BethEnergy argues that it 
developed its medical evidence according to the pre-Kertesz 
standards, which required a showing that the claimant left work 
because of a respiratory related problem.  As such, BethEnergy 
claims that it was unnecessary to develop further evidence 
regarding (b)(3) rebuttal because "the pre-Kertesz rule obviated 
the need to prove that disabling conditions that were not 
respiratory in origin did not 'arise in whole or part out of coal 
mine employment.'" (Quoting (b)(3)).  Brief at 14.  Since 
BethEnergy apparently had developed evidence tending to 
illustrate that Vrobel's total disability was non-respiratory in 
nature, it argues that it should be permitted to develop 
additional evidence addressing the post-Kertesz standards 
affecting (b)(2) and (b)(3) rebuttal.   
  
1-23 (1987).  Construing Marcum, the ALJ stated that (b)(3) 
rebuttal could be invoked "if the weight of the evidence 
establishes that the Claimant did not have a totally disabling 
pulmonary or respiratory impairment."5  App. at 58.  The ALJ then 
adopted his finding in the initial decision that there was no 
medical evidence which established a totally disabling 
respiratory impairment.  App. at 58.  Consequently the ALJ 
determined that application of the Marcum standard precluded a 
recovery of benefits. 
 Vrobel appealed to the Board, claiming that the ALJ's 
finding that BethEnergy established (b)(3) rebuttal was erroneous 
because he incorrectly applied the (b)(3) rebuttal standard.  
Vrobel further argued that proper application of Bernardo would 
illustrate that BethEnergy could not establish (b)(3) rebuttal, 
just as the ALJ previously determined when he applied the correct 
standard in the Decision and Order on remand.  On April 11, 1990, 
BethEnergy responded, asserting that the ALJ's (b)(3) rebuttal 
finding on reconsideration was correct because the physicians' 
opinions contained in the record ruled out any relationship 
between coal dust exposure and disability, thereby addressing the 
source of the miner's disability.  App. at 45-47.   
                     
5
.    This standard is incorrect as Bernardo v. Director, OWCP, 
790 F.2d at 353, set forth the controlling law with respect to 
(b)(3) rebuttal at the time the ALJ decided this case.  Bernardo 
establishes that (b)(3) is concerned with the source of 
disability and not the degree.  Id.  In other words, Bernardo 
requires an inquiry into the causation of the disability.  It 
should be noted, however, that the ALJ properly cited and applied 
Bernardo in his Decision and Order on Remand in which he awarded 
benefits to Vrobel.  App. at 113.   
  
 On December 29, 1992, the Board determined that the ALJ 
applied the wrong standard when he concluded that rebuttal was 
established under (b)(3).  The Board reasoned that inasmuch as 
the ALJ found that Vrobel had a respiratory impairment arising 
out of coal mine employment, app. at 109, 153, the issue to 
decide, in accordance with Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 
727 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1984), was whether this respiratory 
impairment was a contributing cause of the miner's total 
disability or whether it aggravated his total disability.6  App. 
at 37.  As we explained in Kline v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 
1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1989), for rebuttal under (b)(3) "it is 
necessary to 'rule out' a possible causal connection between a 
miner's disability and his coal mine employment." 
 The Board then stated that the ALJ properly had 
considered (b)(3) rebuttal in his initial Decision and Order on 
Remand, in which he awarded benefits.  The Board indicated that 
in the ALJ's decision on reconsideration he had applied the wrong 
test when he held that (b)(3) rebuttal was established since 
Vrobel did not have a totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory 
impairment.  Furthermore, the Board noted that the ALJ credited 
the medical opinions that Vrobel had a pulmonary impairment 
arising out of his coal mine employment, thereby justifying a 
determination that BethEnergy failed to show that there was "no 
                     
6
.    As we discussed earlier, Bernardo requires an inquiry into 
the source of the miner's total disability.  See note 5, supra.  
Carozza, in combination with Bernardo, requires that a party 
opposing entitlement must demonstrate that pneumoconiosis is not 
a contributing or aggravating cause of the disability.   
  
significant relationship" between disability and coal mine 
employment.  Id. at 37.  The Board also concluded that because 
BethEnergy failed to meet the "no significant relationship" test, 
which it regarded as less stringent and more easily met than the 
Carozza no "contribution standard," the ALJ's initial finding 
precluded rebuttal under Carozza.  Therefore, the Board reversed 
the ALJ's finding of (b)(3) rebuttal and awarded benefits. 
 On January 25, 1993, BethEnergy requested that the 
Board reconsider its award of benefits to Vrobel.  It premised 
this request on two arguments: (1) due process and fundamental 
fairness require that BethEnergy be given an opportunity to 
develop new evidence to address the standard for establishing 
(b)(2) and (b)(3) rebuttal, which allegedly changed during the 
litigation of Vrobel's claim; and (2) the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 108 
S.Ct. 427 (1987), concerning the invocation of the interim 
presumption of total disability under C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1) 
warranted reconsideration by the ALJ.  App. at 31-32.  The Board 
denied BethEnergy's motion on April 6, 1994.  App. at 25. 
 On this petition, BethEnergy challenges the Board's 
denial of its motion for reconsideration.  In particular, 
BethEnergy asserts that it never has been granted an opportunity 
to have the medical evidence which it has developed interpreted 
to satisfy the proper burdens for establishing rebuttal under 
(b)(2) and (b)(3). 
 
 II.  DISCUSSION  
  
A.  The Standard of Review 
 We review the decisions of the Board for errors of law 
and to assure that it has adhered to its own standard of review.  
Director, OWCP v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1526-27 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Thus, our inquiry is limited to a determination 
of whether the Board acted in conformity with applicable law and 
within its proper scope of review.  Kertesz v. Crescent Hills 
Coal Co., 788 F.2d at 162-63.  Our review of the Board's legal 
determinations is plenary.  Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d at 
1526-27; Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F.2d at 77.  
Of course, the Board must accept an ALJ's findings of fact if 
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole.  33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); Oravitz v. 
Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738, 739 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 B.  BethEnergy's Claims 
 BethEnergy argues that it is entitled to a new hearing 
to respond to a change in the law that invalidated its rebuttal 
proof.  It bases this assertion on two arguments.  First, it 
claims that the Board violated its statutory authority by 
engaging in de novo fact finding.  Second, it asserts that its 
due process rights were violated when the Board refused to reopen 
the record to afford it an opportunity to develop evidence to 
address new standards of proof regarding rebuttal under (b)(2) 
and (b)(3).  Both arguments lack merit. 
1.  De Novo Fact Finding 
 BethEnergy asserts that the Board overstepped its 
statutory authority by making factual findings regarding (b)(2) 
  
and (b)(3) rebuttal.  In particular, it claims that because the 
ALJ found that Vrobel retained the pulmonary capacity to perform 
his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work, it had 
established (b)(2) rebuttal.  Brief at 12.  It then asserts that 
the Board engaged in fact finding in rejecting (b)(2) rebuttal.  
We reject this argument as it has no factual or legal support in 
the record. 
 As the Director points out, the ALJ found that 
BethEnergy established (b)(2) rebuttal only in his initial 
Decision and Order.  However, as the Director also notes, he 
reached this conclusion by applying the wrong rebuttal standard.  
After the Board remanded the case with instructions to apply the 
proper (b)(2) rebuttal standard in accordance with Kertesz, the 
ALJ specifically found that (b)(2) rebuttal was not established.  
App. at 58, 108.  Furthermore, the Board never upset the finding 
by the ALJ concerning BethEnergy's lack of proof to establish 
(b)(2) rebuttal under the proper standard.   
 BethEnergy also claims that the Board engaged in de 
novo fact finding when it reversed the ALJ's finding that 
BethEnergy established (b)(3) rebuttal.  The argument is that 
once the Board determined that the ALJ applied the wrong standard 
on reconsideration the Board should have remanded the case to the 
ALJ with instructions to review the evidence under the correct 
standard.  BethEnergy claims that the Board instead weighed the 
evidence de novo, and concluded that BethEnergy did not establish 
rebuttal under the post-Kertesz standards.  In BethEnergy's view, 
  
these actions were beyond the Board's statutory powers, and, as 
such, warrant a remand of the case. 
 The Director argues that the Board did not engage in de 
novo fact finding, but only reinstated the ALJ's initial findings 
made on remand.  In particular, the Director claims that (b)(3) 
rebuttal was precluded because BethEnergy failed to establish 
that there was no significant relationship between the total 
disability and Vrobel's coal mine employment.  App. at 109.   
 In view of the parties' contentions we consider whether 
the Board engaged in de novo fact finding when it reversed the 
ALJ's decision regarding (b)(3) rebuttal.  The Board's power to 
hear disputes concerning claims under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
is derived from 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), which provides: 
 The Board shall be authorized to hear and 
determine appeals raising a substantial 
question of law or fact taken by any party in 
interest from decisions with respect to 
claims of employees under this chapter and 
the extensions thereof.  (Emphasis supplied.) 
The statutory language has been interpreted to prohibit the Board 
from making a de novo factual review, Oravitz v. Director, OWCP, 
738 F.2d at 739, instead requiring it to accept an ALJ's findings 
unless they are contrary to law, irrational, or unsupported by 
substantial evidence in the record.  King v. Director, OWCP, 904 
F.2d 17, 18 (9th Cir. 1990); Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Krecota, 868 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1989).  See also 20 C.F.R § 
802.301. 
  
 The proper (b)(3) rebuttal standard requires that the 
party opposing entitlement demonstrate that the miner's 
respiratory impairment was not a contributing cause of his total 
disability or did not aggravate his total disability.  Carozza, 
727 F.2d at 78.  The Board determined that BethEnergy did not 
meet this standard.   
 In reversing the ALJ, the Board acted within the scope 
of its delegated powers to make legal determinations because the 
decision of the ALJ on reconsideration on remand that BethEnergy 
established (b)(3) rebuttal as Vrobel did not have a totally 
disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment was clearly 
contrary to law.  BethEnergy argues that the case should have 
been remanded to the ALJ for a proper application of the Carozza 
standard.  While the Board could have remanded the matter, we 
hardly can fault it for bringing these protracted proceedings to 
a close.  Indeed, we followed a similar course in Sulyma v. 
Director, OWCP, 827 F.2d 922, 924 (3d Cir. 1987).  In that case 
the Director conceded on appeal in this court that the claimant 
was entitled to the interim presumption of total disability 
denied in the administrative proceedings.  However, the Director 
sought a remand of the case for consideration of whether the 
presumption had been rebutted.  But we would not remand the case.  
Rather, "in consideration of the age of" the case, we relied on 
our own view of the record and concluded that the presumption had 
not been rebutted.  Here, the Board took even less intrusive 
action as, rather than drawing factual conclusions, it accepted 
  
and applied the ALJ's previous factual finding, made under the 
correct legal standard. 
 When the Board reversed the ALJ's determination that 
(b)(3) rebuttal had been established, it recognized that 
BethEnergy could not satisfy the Carozza requirement for (b)(3) 
rebuttal.  It based this conclusion on the reasoning that because 
the ALJ determined that BethEnergy could not establish that there 
was "no significant relationship" between Vrobel's total 
disability and his coal mine employment, BethEnergy could not 
establish that the miner's pneumoconiosis was not a "contributing 
cause" of disability.  App. at 37.  We regard the Board's 
conclusion as logically unassailable.  Indeed, the Board believed 
that it is easier to establish that there is no significant 
relationship between the total disability and the employment than 
it is to establish that pneumoconisis is not a contributing cause 
to the disability.   
 We acknowledge that evaluation of medical evidence is 
entrusted to the ALJ.  As we noted in Caprini v. Director, OWCP, 
824 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1987): 
 [t]he ALJ should first have the opportunity 
to consider the evidence, make his ruling, 
and state his reasons.  The Board may then 
consider the matter if the aggrieved party 
wishes to appeal.  
But the proceeding in this case fully comported with Caprini as 
the ALJ made the critical factual determinations on the basis of 
the record.  Thus, a remand was not necessary as ". . . the 
record [was] so clear that under the correct standard the result 
  
[was] foreordained."  Id.  See also Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman, 
17 F.3d 361 (11th Cir. 1994) (court of appeals may reinstate 
findings of ALJ overturned by Board); Sykes v. Director, OWCP, 
812 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1987) (same).  In order to justify a 
remand the Board would had to have concluded that the ALJ might 
deviate from his prior finding.  The Board had no reason to reach 
such a conclusion. 
2.  The Due Process Argument 
 BethEnergy asserts that due process of law requires 
that it be afforded an opportunity to develop evidence to address 
new standards of proof regarding rebuttal under (b)(2) and 
(b)(3).  In this regard BethEnergy claims that our opinion in 
Kertesz on April 14, 1986, effectively changed the legal standard 
for establishing rebuttal under (b)(2) but that BethEnergy 
developed its medical evidence in 1983.  
 We see no need for an extended discussion on this point 
as BethEnergy clearly had an opportunity to develop evidence 
under the Kertesz standard for we decided that case on April 14, 
1986, and the initial hearing before the ALJ in this matter was 
on December 18, 1986.  Furthermore, BethEnergy could have sought 
even more time under 20 C.F.R. § 725.454 to prepare its case but 
it did not do so.  In these circumstances BethEnergy's due 
process argument is insubstantial.   
 In reaching this conclusion we have not overlooked Marx 
v. Director, OWCP, 870 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1989), on which 
BethEnergy relies.  But Marx is not helpful to BethEnergy.  That 
case involved a situation in which a party presented her case in 
  
conformity with practice existing at the time of the hearing.  
However, following the hearing there was a change in the 
applicable law.  In those circumstances we held that the claimant 
was entitled to a remand to "have the opportunity to introduce 
evidence which satisfies [the new] standard."  Thus, Marx does 
not support an argument that a litigant should be entitled to a 
remand to meet standards established before a hearing.     
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the aforementioned reasons, the petition for review 
is denied. 
                
 
 
 
